example, few would dispute the assertion that compulsory admission and compulsory treatment are separate processes, although many psychiatrists may well see them as more closely interrelated than does Gostin. Again, who would seriously challenge the view that detained patients very often understand the nature and purpose of proposed treatments, that any 'unsoundness' of mind is usually disabling in limited respects only and that the justification of compulsory treatment rests on establishing incapacity in terms of competence and an impaired ability to provide informed consent? At times during his paper Gostin puts forward generally accepted propositions with all the tentativeness of a bomb disposal squad approaching a suspicious package. In fairness, it may be that such caution reflects his experience in dealing with the psychiatric profession.
The issue, therefore, is not so much the problems between law and psychiatry as how they might best be tackled. Gostin believes in tightening the law, bringing about a more substantial legal and lay input in the shape of strengthened multidisciplinary mental health tribunals, placing treatments characterized as 'irreversible, hazardous or not fully established' under particular controls and broadening the notion of the independent second opinion. Now Gostin is puzzled by the fact that psychiatrists who share his diagnostic assessment of the problems are not wildly enamoured of his suggested treatment. Doubtless, some are motivated by reasons imputed by critics and are anxious to hang on to such powers as they hold. Others are unhappy' for the somewhat more selfless reason that they are unimpressed by what happens to people clinically when the impersonal majesty of the law grinds into action. There are others, too, who believe that the patient may fare . better under a system of care that is prone to 0141-0768/81/110787-03/$01.00/0 occasional excesses of therapeutic zeal and scientific research than under a system captive to legalistic and bureaucratic inertia.
One of the problems that bedevils the present discussion is that neither of the two groups of protagonists ever appears to listen to the other. Psychiatrists do not always understand that Gostin (and the European Convention of Human Rights) is anxious that every detained patient, short-term or long-term, should have access to an independent and multidisciplinary body so that the lawfulness of the detention involved should be assessed. Since Section 25, which allows for detention for up to 28days, does not entitle a patient to such an appeal, the pressure to prevent clinicians to treat under the terms of such a section has been intensified. While such a tactic is reasonable from a legal point of view it is highly objectionable from a clinical standpoint. Many manic patients are compulsorily detained for treatment and not for observation. Treated without delay and appropriately, they can be expected to recover insight and become voluntary patients or even be discharged within 28 days. The elaborate procedure of a Section 26 is quite redundant. Having to embark on implementing this Section is, as a consequence, seen by many psychiatrists as an unnecessary and wasteful exercise largely undertaken to satisfy neither patients nor relatives but lawyers.
But the area in which Gostin does tread on dangerous ground concerns the question of hazardous or experimental treatment. When Gostin first proposed the notion of hazardous, irreversible and experimental treatments (Gostin 1975) , and later when the DHSS took hold of it and hauled it, lock, stock and barrel, on board its 'Review of the Mental Health Act' (DHSS 1976) , it did seem as if reforming zeal would triumph at the expense of commonsense. Gostin has never been quite clear what he means by 'hazardous' treatment, and while this latest paper is somewhat more explicit it still leaves a number of issues unresolved. The example of a 'hazardous' treatment which psychiatric critics usually select is ECT. After all, it is now banned in several American States, its use in many others is severely circumscribed and its standing in the eyes of the lay public has been seriously damaged as a consequence of a lengthy campaign to discredit its rationale. Gostin, however, is well aware that the evidence which supports the notion that ECT is a particularly hazardous treatment is flimsy. Accordingly, he is forced to include ECT within the group of special treatments not because it is hazardous but because it is experimental! But because the bulk of psychiatric opinion accepts that ECT has a role in the treatment of depression, it is not ECT in general which is 'experimental', thereby qualifying for special treatment, but ECT in conditions other than depression. Gostin selects schizophrenia and argues that the use of ECT in this case is experimental because it is being used in a situation which is not justified 'by past research or agreed practice'.
This illustrates very neatly the sort of mess which may occur when lawyers stray into clinical areas. There is indeed no unequivocal scientific evidence that ECT is effective in catatonic schizophrenia, but there is a fairly sizeable chunk of psychiatric opinion, Gostin's own views notwithstanding, which believes that it can be. Nor is ECT any more hazardous, irreversible or indeed experimental than long-acting phenothiazines, lithium carbonate or the various kinds of psychotherapy, including psychoanalysis. The fact that medical orthodoxy does or does not confer its approval on the use ofa treatment is not a very reliable or secure legal basis on which to proceed.
It is not at all clear from Gostin's paper whether he believes that treatments classified as hazardous, irreversible or experimental should always be subjected to independent review or only when their use in the treatment of detained patients is being considered. It is a somewhat disturbing ambiguity. Indeed, it was Gostin's blurring of the distinction between voluntary and detained patients in his first book, 'A Human Condition' (Gostin 1975) , with its unfortunate implication that psychiatrists were coercing the vast majority of voluntary patients into hospital against their will, which sowed the seeds for much of the profession's unease concerning MIND's mental health proposals. Here again, Gostin appears to be implying that psychiatrists cannot even be trusted with psychiatric treatments when treating patients who have voluntarily placed themselves in the profession's power. He explicitly declares that doctors cannot be trusted to provide a genuinely independent second opinion, hence his call for a review tribunal to decide on issues such as consent and competency, and this uncompromising position hardly endears him further to entrenched psychiatric opinion. Orthodox psychiatrists shout 'medical responsibility' and 'clinical freedom' from behind the barricades at each and every suggestion to curtail their clinical power and subject their decisions to wider scrutiny.
However, such acrimony only serves to obscure the extent of the common ground. Gostin writes as the legal advisor to MIND and his views are in general endorsed by that energetic and crusading organization. The body that speaks for the psychiatrists, namely the Royal College of Psychiatrists, has just recently made public its own proposals with regard to many of the issues discussed by Gostin (Bluglass 1981) . Essentially what the College is proposing is the formation of a mental health commission or commissions, along the lines of the Scottish Mental Welfare Commission, to look after the rights of individually mentally disordered persons. Such a body would scrutinize admission documents, assess appeals from detained patients, advise patients and relatives of their rights and arrange second opinions. The proposed commission would also be empowered to 'advise for which treatments and under which circumstances second opinions should be obtained'.
It seems that the College's proposals bear more than a passing resemblance to MIND's multidisciplinary tribunals. The commissions would be chaired by an experienced and senior lawyer, would consist of members of the medical and other professions 'as well as lay members' and would possess a permanent secretariat. Gostin must wonder why the psychiatrists, having reacted with such hostility and hurt pride to his suggestion that there be multidisciplinary review panels, should now propose something remarkably similar while calling it another name. Would not the proposed mental health commission, with powers relating to issues of competence, informed consent and psychiatric treatment, constitute an infringement of the individual doctor's clinical freedom? Apparently not. Gostin would be well advised to suppress his sense of wonder and begin at once to explore how the common ground that exists between these proposals and those of MIND might be appropriately cultivated. A solution acceptable to both organizations would go far to ensure that the mental health field in this country is spared the interminable, costly and polemical dispute which has so demeaned the law-psychiatry 'interface' in the United States.
There are just some of the thoughts provoked by Gostin's paper. But there is the mote general one relating overall to the contribution he has made to the debate concerning psychiatric power and mental health legislation over the past few years. Some of Gostin's proposals are redolent of legalism, others reflect an American rather than a British legal tradition. At times, he has been inordinately tactless concerning the standards and attitudes of British psychiatrists, at times he has been downright inaccurate. But at all times Gostin has struggled to engage psychiatrists ind ebate concerning the remarkable powers entrusted to them by the state. In the words of a leading contemporary philosopher, the fully trained psychiatrist 'needs to be not just a technically competent practitioner, but also a morally perceptive agent and even something of a social critic' (Toulmin 1980). Psychiatrists sometimes appear indifferent to the powers they possess, yet the potential for psychiatric abuse is intrinsic to psychiatric practice. Urgent is the demand that psychiatric training includes an explicit and balanced discussion of the ethical and political responsibilities that lie at the centre of competent psychiatric practice. In so far as Gostin's efforts reflect such a concern, they are to be encouraged. What should be done about hearing lmpalrments?' Meaningless statements about prevalence of hearing impairment, lacking a specified criterion, have circulated in the past. From the point of view of average disability (rather than diagnosis), material hearing impairment can be defined as an average hearing level in the better ear over the frequencies 0.5-4.0 kHz which is worse by 25 decibels than the 'normal' standard. The pilot study for the National Study of Hearing (NSH) reported in this issue (Institute of Hearing Research, p 819) suggests that such impairment appears to characterize approximately 20% of the adult British population. The corresponding prevalence at 35 dB (a severity conventionally accepted as accompanying clinically significant disability, whatever the aetiology) is approaching 10"10 of the adult population or 4.2 million people in the UK (Haggard et al. 1981) . The facts need to I Based on paper read to Section of Otology, 6 February 1981 be checked, refined and subdivided according to epidemiological categories and the causes established where possible, for which purpose the NSH is in progress. However, at the broadest level the facts are not seriously at issue.
ENT otological services are largely oriented towards diagnosing and treating accessible organic pathology, and do this with considerable efficiency. Few would argue that it is best to break the chain of pathogen-disease-impairmentdisability-handicap at the earliest possible stage, even if (up to a point) the average cost per patient of so doing is higher than for later remedial action. But in adults pathology of the largely inaccessible inner ear is more common than pathology of the middle ear and the majority of aetiologies, at least until research opens new avenues in prevention and treatment, there is only one cost-effective intervention. This is a prosthesis which reduces one aspect of the impairment and, in the majority of cases, partly reduces the consequent disability. This device is the mass-produced, semi-miniaturized, lowfidelity, personally-worn amplifier -generally, if imprecisely, called a hearing aid. Service improvements are under way in other aspects of audiology also, but aids deserve our undivided attention here.
For particular forms of impairment the benefit from an aid may be limited, and the skills offitting at the point of delivery are often deficient. But the estimate for numbers possessing a hearing aid is now around 1.5 million, of which about 80% are supplied by the NHS (Haggard et al. 1981) .This is over twice the number in 1973, so hearing aids are successful at some level. The numbers justify considerable intellectual and administrative effort directed towards optimizing, streamlining, improving and diversifying the service. But rather few scientists and doctors are interested and the UK probably has too few professional engineers to spare for much involvement. Improvements in the technology and supply of Health Service aids have been due to bulk purchase by the Health Departments following some years behind technological innovation in the international private sector. The very success of the postaural aid programme (1974 to date) may have partly obscured the need for further progress. The DHSS's Advisory Committee on Services for Hearing Impaired People (ACSHIP) has recently been disbanded. There is a risk in the present financial stringency that the duration for which many people live with their hearing impairments will be overlooked; that recurrent funds may be restricted and development funds may be preempted by those medical specialties of which some patients are liable to die for reasons
